Nine Moments When the Axis Lost the War August 10, 2015
Author: Beach Combing | in : Contemporary , trackback
The sequel to Beach’s seven reasons why Germany lost the Great War.
1) When Germany didn’t destroy the British Expeditionary Force: at the end of May 1940 about a third of a million British servicemen, the Empire’s entire European army was trapped in a small pocket on the northern French coast. Demoralised, with their equipment lost and Blighty a long way away Hitler’s panzers should have rolled over the survivors: yet Hitler effectively, for reasons that are still debated, let the BEF escape
2) When Germany failed to invade Britain: There was one moment when an invasion of Britain might have had a slim but credible chance of success, as Kesselring noted in his memoirs. In May 1940 with the British army fighting and losing in France an airborne attack may just have brought results: it would have been a great gamble but perhaps more productive than the blooding of the Luftwaffe three months later.
3) When Italy entered the war: compared to fearsome Japan and Germany Italy was sub-standard. It had a capable if inefficient airforce, an efficient though badly led navy and a simply appalling army. In the end the presence of Italy in the war was far more trouble than it was worth for Hitler. A neutral but threatening Italy in the Mediterranean would have blocked off the southern approaches and have meant a friend in the region, an airline, much as the Netherlands had been for Germans in WW1.
4) When Germany invaded Russia: France got convincingly knocked out of the war in June 1940. If von Moltke (junior or senior) had been on the scene he would have congratulated Hitler and then told him to negotiate with Britain or to invade or to cow the country into peace, perhaps with activities in the Mediterranean together with Italy. Perhaps alternatively Hitler should have concentrated on the Soviet Union from the beginning. If he could have staked his early authority on Poland rather than the Czech Republic and then turned on the Soviets the western democracies would not have lifted a finger.
5) When Germany didn’t invade the Mediterranean: The Mediterranean was a strategic area for Britain simply because it allowed a ‘short cut’ from the Indian and the Pacific, through Suez to the the UK. It also led to the vast oil reserves of the Middle East, oil reserves that Britain depended upon. Italy could not handle the UK in the Mediterranean, but perhaps five more German divisions under Rommel would have been enough to drive the British out of Egypt and perhaps as far as the Indian border. In 1942 Hitler could even have joined the Japanese in an attack on the Raj. Crucial little Malta instead of useless rocky Crete may have made a difference too.
6) When Japan attacked Pearl Harbor: The devastating raid of 7 December set Japan at odds with the US. What if, instead, Japan had started north into the Soviet Union in coordination with the Third Reich? Had that happened: the US would have remained neutral; the USSR may have fallen or been forced to negotiate for a surviving rump; and Japan would have been able to concentrate on China. One of the most striking problems of the Axis were their inability to coordinate: Hitler invaded the USSR without warning Japan or Italy; Mussolini invaded Greece without warning Japan or Germany; and Japan attacked the US without a word to Germany or Italy.
7) When Hitler declared war on the US: The US had no choice but to declare war on Japan, but would Roosevelt have had the authority to bring his country into a European war against Germany? Roosevelt by late 1941 seems to have been banking on doing this, and surely it would have happened in the end, but he would have faced an uphill struggle for some months. Yet Hitler made things a great deal easier by declaring war on the US. It is often noted that the US Navy had already been at war with Germany in the Atlantic for over a year by the attack on Pearl. But having US destroyers depth charge your submarines is very different from having US bombers circle over Berlin.
8) When Hitler did not allow the retreat from Stalingrad. As the winter of 1942 began to take hold it would have made sense for the Germans to cash in some prestige and remove themselves from Stalingrad. Even after Operation Uranus a breakout might have worked: at the loss of a great deal of German hardware. However, from 1942 onwards, Hitler refused almost all suggestions of strategic withdrawals: though Italy showed how creative the Germans were even when they were moving backwards.
9) When Hitler survived the bomb plot of July 1944: Hitler seems to have understood, even to have said, that the war was unwinnable from 1942. From then on his main aim, and it was an intelligent one, was to break up the unnatural coalition of his enemies, particularly levering the Soviet Union away from the British and Americans. This was always a long shot. However, if Stalin and the Allies were ever to argue and face off then a necessary prerequisite would have been the death of Hitler. Perhaps there was then a one percent chance that Roosevelt and Churchill could have come to terms and left Germany and Stalin to punch it out.
And no 10? drbeachcombing AT yahoo DOT com
29 August 2015: Nathaniel writes ‘Re point #6 (Japan attacking Pearl Harbor instead of the Soviet Union), Japan had already tried attacking the Soviet Union and been defeated. After those events both sides needed their armies elsewhere and there was no more fighting between them until near the end of the war. Stalin in fact was so determined to keep the peace that he denied use of Soviet bases to the Doolittle Raid, and interned U.S. aircrews who landed in Soviet territory after bombing Japan. Chris S. on the same point Reminds me of PKD’s Man in the High Castle where America unsuccessfully fought the Axis on two fronts, ended up being occupied by Germany and Japan. Imagine a split Soviet Russia with Japan in the West and Nazis in the east, and maybe a few enclaves/oblasts maintaining the spirit of Stalin.’ KHM ‘Hitler’s Wannsee Conference of January 20, 1942, put the final solution for the Jews into operation. As a result, much effort and resources went into finding and transporting Jews to the death camps, rather than the military where it was really needed, especially on the Eastern Front. We are considering the needed manpower, the scheduled trains, building the camps, manufacturing the gas ovens, and all the paraphernalia associated with the operation. It is highly unusual for any nation in total war to maintain a dual objective the same way Hitler did.’ Tacitus from Detritus of Empire writes: I have an atypical moment when the Axis lost the war. 10 January, 1940. The Mechelen Incident. For those who have not heard of it, this was when a Luftwaffe light plane landed on the wrong side of the border due to bad weather. The pilot was only in the air because he needed some more flying hours and wanted to bring his laundry home to Cologne! The more problematic passenger was a Major Reinburger who was carrying secret documents that the pilot did not know about. The Major wanted to avoid a long boring train ride. Evidently these two happened to be having a drink together and the trip was just as spontaneous as the sudden change in weather that brought them down a few miles into Belgian territory. Despite several partially successful, and rather comedic, attempts to destroy the documents, Belgian and soon French military commands soon had a general outline of an imminent German attack with a main direction from Holland down through Belgium and into northern France. There is some debate as to whether the cancellation a few days later of this unimaginative battle plan was due to the security breach, the ongoing foul weather or the realization that it was a lousy plan. But…. Had this mid winter attack gone forward the war would have had a much different trajectory, and several of the previously listed fatal events would have been impossible. Perhaps the Germans would have prevailed after a longer, more costly struggle. One in which Italy and Japan would have not been lured in by the illusion of Teutonic invincibility. An attack on Russia a year later would have been unthinkable. Would Germany have won a strictly “Continental” war minus the moderate hindrance of Italian help and the enormous liability of being caught in conflict with the US? Eh, fortunes of War, one never knows. But better than 50:50 and a more plausible alternate history departure point than several of the other suggested ones…… Dirty socks and a drink at the Offizier Klub. On such trivial hinges does History turn.
